前幾天終於閱讀完了Michael J. Sandel 教授的 Justice-what's the right thing to do 這本書
會知道這本書其實還是在博客萊網路書店看到有中文譯本
想說反正現在身處美國 就在網路上買了英文原版的來翻翻
等回到台灣後再看一次翻譯的
看看我是不是真的理解了
...
基本上這本書都是在論議哲學上的東西
提到了很多哲學家與他們對政治的看法
從這本書裡我才第一次曉得Kant原來想法這麼與我契合（應該說我被他說服了吧XD)
不過這裡面的確有很多 Sandel 教授談到的 不知道該用倫理還是社會普遍共識來解決的問題
最後有提到同性戀婚姻 墮胎 借腹生子等等敏感的議題
那都有支持與反對派
而美一派都有自己的主張 與自以為的“正義”
但其實最後
真正的正義是什麼？
是所謂的 virtue 嗎？可是那virtue又是什麼？對每個人的定義又都不太一樣吧？
是否活的自在才是最重要的呢？
也許打從盤古開天以來就沒有答案。 也從來不會有答案吧？
Here are some quotes I like:
page 7
"Greed is a vice, a bad way of being, especially when it makes people oblivious to the suffering of others. More than a personal vice, it is at odds with civic virtue. In times of trouble, a good society pulls together. Rather than press for maximum advantage, people look out for one another. A society in which people exploit their neighbors for financial gain in times of crisis is not a good society. Excessive greed is therefore a vice that a good society should discourage if it can."
Page 9:
"...Instead, a just society respects each person's freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good life."
page 15:
"Americans are harder on failure than on greed."
page 19:
"To ask whether a society is just is to ask how it distributes the things we prize-income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right way; it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions begin when we ask what people are due, and why."
page 23:
"...But doing the right thing is not always easy."
page 24:
"If moral reflection consists in seeking a fit between the judgments we make and the principles we affirm, how can such reflection lead us to justice, or moral truth? Even if we succeed, over a lifetime, in bringing our moral intuitions and principled commitments into alignment, what confidence can we have that the result is anything more than a self-consistent skein of prejudice? The answer is that moral reflection is not a solitary pursuit but a public endeavor."
page 51:
"One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam engine has character."
Idea derived from page 53:
只有身處痛苦才渴求快樂 如果周圍沒有苦痛 是不會發現 現在的快樂 快樂與苦痛是相對的
那為什麼人會一直追求快樂呢 是不是因為人一直都處在痛苦的環境裡呢？
是什麼讓我們痛苦？ 是慾望吧？
所以真正快樂的人 喔不 這世界恐怕沒有絕對的快樂 只有相對的快樂與苦痛 沒有秤可以衡量
那是不是說感受不到苦痛的人就是快樂的呢？
那也是我們從旁觀的角度去定義那個人快樂吧？
那暫且撇開評定他人之說 反省自己之後：
最後也只有讓自己不要感受到苦痛 也就真正達到了“快樂”
可是追求無慾的慾望 想要快樂的那個苦痛 本身又回到道家思想中 那個想要達到“無為”的“為”了
身為人 果然沒辦法逃脫“思想”的煎熬阿
Page 55
" Mill makes this point in a memorable passage: 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.'"
第三章 libertarianism
這章節的“自由意志論”還蠻有趣的～
講到是否該規定騎機車的人都要戴安全帽
在他沒提出之前我倒是真的沒想過
戴不戴安全帽真的是個人要負擔其危險性
現在夏天 戴安全帽很不舒服
而騎士自己如果願意承擔沒戴安全帽發生事故的危險的話 那不戴安全帽騎機車又何嘗不可呢？
這是算尊重個人權益吧？
雖然政府的交通部門宣導這是為民眾好 以及交通安全
但不論出發點是好是壞
如果今天某騎士沒有心情戴安全帽
而又因為不戴會被罰錢 違反他的意志去做的話
就與Libertarian所倡導的自由意志相悖了
可是這也許會與功利主義起衝突
如果大家都這樣做 那久而久之 死亡率增高
對這個社會長久來說就不好 還得為此浪費醫療資源
但是想想也沒有不對
這是個人權至上的社會 如果在不傷害他人的前提之下享有自己的利益
政府或第三者是沒有權力束縛任何一人的 不是嗎？
Page 90:
"What obligations do citizens of a democratic society owe to one another, and how do such obligations arise? Different theories of justice offer dfferent answers to this question."
Page 97:
"...human beings are persons worthy of respect, not objects to be used. Respect and use are two different modes of valuation."
Page 98:
"Since human beings are capable of freedom, we shouldnt be used as if we were mrer objects, but should be treated instead with dignity and respect. This approach emphasizes the distinction between persons (worthy of respect) and mrer objects or things (open to use) as the fundamental distinction in mmorality. The greatest defender of this approach is Immanuel Kant, to whom we turn in the next chapter."
關於代理孕母
這裡竟然提到有很多“台灣人”到印度尋求代理孕母！
希望這位教授對台灣的印象不要只是這樣而已阿！
讀到目前為止唯一一次提及台灣 竟是這個議題～
看來塑化劑對台灣民眾不育影響很深阿！
還有就是這邊提到
難道現在把 懷孕生子交給三位不同的女性 就與販賣人口無關 與正義無關了嗎
這的確是一大難題
也許給與卵子的女性不會與出生的嬰兒有什麼感情
但是借腹生子的那位一定會與胎兒有某種情感的聯繫
畢竟那小孩也在他肚子裡待了十個月 姑且不論那小孩與她有無血緣關係
最後的那位領養的母親 也許會提供母愛
但是真的可以跨越那與小孩沒有直接關係的心裡障礙嗎
想到那個孩子是別人與自己的丈夫生的
難道心裡不會不舒服嗎
就倫理道德來說 我並不太支持這個代理孕母的想法
兩個人在一起如果不能生下自己的孩子 可以去領養吧？
代替別人生小孩這種違反自然的做法
老實說不好吧？
page 103:
"My life, labor, and person belong to me and me alone."
page 104:
"we are rational beings, worthy of dignity and respect."
page 105:
"What is the supreme principle of morality? And in the course of answering that question, it addresses another hugely important one: What is freedom?"
page 106:
"Just because something gives many people pleasure doesn't make it right. The mere fact that the majority, however big, favors a certain law, howwever intensely, does not make the law just."
page 107:
"Basing morality on interests and preferences destroys its dignity."
"Kant argues that every person is worthy of respect, not because we own ourselves but because we are rational beings, capable of reason; we are also autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing freely. Kant doesn't mean that we always succeed in acting rationally, or in choosing autonomously. Sometimes we do and sometimes we don't. He means only that we have the capacity for reason, and for freedom, and that this capacity is common to human beings as such."
page 108:
"Our capacity for reason is bound up with our capacity for freedom. Taken together, these capacities make us distinctie, and set us apart from mere animal existence. They make us more than mere creatures of appetite."
page 109:
"To act freely, according to Kant, is to act autonomously. And to act autonomously is to act according to a law I give myself--not according to the dictates of nature or social convention."
page 111:
"doing the right thing for the right reason."
page 117:
"Human beings are not exempt from the laws of nature."
page 118:
"We're not only sentient beings, goberned by the pleasure and pain delivered by our senses; we are also rational beings, capable of reason."
page 122:
"Persons are rational beings. They don't just have a relative value, but if anything has, they have an absolute value, an intrinsic value. That is, rational beings have dignity."
page 128:
"If I were only an empirical being, I would not be capable of freedom; every exercise of will would be conditioned by some interest or desire. All choice would be heteronomous choice, governed by the pursuit of some end. My will could never be a first cause, only the effect of some prior cause, the instrument of one or another impulse or inclination."
I like the word: "natural lottery".
page 153:
"The distribution of income and opportunity should not be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view."
page 154:
"According to the meritocratic conception, the distribution of income and wealth that results from a free market is just, but only if everyone has the same opportunity to develop his or her talents. Only if everyone begins at the same starting line can it be said that the winners of the race deserve their rewards."
page 156:
"no one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society."
page 157:
"we should abstract from, or set aside, contingent facts about persons and their social positions."
page 159:
"...despite the talk about effort, it's really contribution, or achievement, that the meritocrat believes is worthy of reward. Whether or not our work ethic is our own doing, our contribution depends, at least in part, on natural talents for which we can claim no credit."
page 162:
"Whether my skills yield a lot or a little depends on what the society happens to want. What counts as contributing depends on the qualities a give society happens to prize."
page 163:
"The successful often overlook this contingent aspect of their success. Many of us are fortunate to possess, at least in some measure, the qualities our society happens to prize...That our society values these things is not our doing."
Page 165:
"The way things are does not determine the way they ought to be.
We should reject the contention that the ordering of institutions is always defective because the distribution of natural talents and the contingencies of social circumstance are unjust, and this injustive must inevitably carry over to human arrangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse for ignoring injustive, as if the refusal to acquiesce in injustice is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts."
所以才有“生不逢時”的感慨阿！
page 179:
"The more we regard our success as our own doing, the less responsibility we feel for those who fall behind."
page 182:
"The just way of allocating access to a good may have something to do with the nature of that good, with its purpose."
page 188:
"Aristotle claims that in order to determine the just distribution of a good, we have to inquire into the telos, or purpose, of the good being distributed."
page 189:
"Nature was seen as having a meaningful order. To understand nature, and our place in it, was to grasp its purpose, its essential meaning."
page 190:
"By the time we are adults, most of us outgrow this way of viewing the nature world, seeing it as charming but quaint."
page 190:
"It's about learning how to live a good life. The purpose of politics is nothing less than to enable people to develop their distincitive human capacities and virtues--to deliberate about the common good, to acquire practical judgment, to share in self-government, to care for the fate of the community as a whole."
page 195:
"Only by living in a polis and participating in politics do we fully realize our nature as human beings....Other animals can make sounds, and sounds can indicate pleasure and pain. But language, a distinctly human capacity, isn't just for registering pleasure and pain. It's about declaring what is just and what is unjust, and distinguishing right from wrong."
page 197:
"Happiness is not a state of mind but a way of being, 'an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.'"
page 199:
"Aristotle defines practical wisdom as 'a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to the human good."
page 201:
"To allocate rights is not to fit people to roles that suit their nature; it is to let people choose their roles for themselves."
Chapter 9-What do we owe one another?
page 211:
"You don't apologize for something you didn't do. So, how can you apologize for something that was done before you were born?"
page 213:
"The doctrine of moral individualism does not assume that people are selfish. It is rather a claim about what it means to be free."
page 215:
"The notion that we are freely choosing, independent selves suppots the idea that the principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular moral or religious conception; instead, they should try to be neutral amond competing visions of the good life."
page 216:
"The appeal of a neutral framework lies precisely in its refusal to affirm a preferred way of life or conception of the good."
page 217:
"The principles that specify our duties and rights should not be based on any particular conception of the good life."
page 221:
"Human beings are storytelling beings. We live our lives as narrative quests."
page 222:
"...the narrative, or teleological, aspect of moral reflection is bound up with membership and belonging."
page 224:
"Whether we must concern ourselves with the good of other people depends on whether, and with whom, we have agreed to do so."
在這章節有講到border patrols 就是說有一群“愛國者”整天會坐在電腦桌前 盯著螢幕監視有沒有非法移民企圖越過美國邊界
看到這段我心裡只有os: 有沒有這麼無聊阿！整天就發呆看著電腦嗎？come on, 又不是每分每秒都有人想越邊界 就這樣呆坐不是很浪費生命嗎？
果然 我們揶揄人說美國時間不是沒有道理的...要是我要這樣看著螢幕 1分鐘我就會發瘋了吧！？
page 235:
" Pride and shame are moral sentiments that presuppose a shared identity....The capacity for pride and shame in the actions of family members and fellow citizens is related to the capacity for collective responsibility....With belonging comes responsibility."
page 241:
"...obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice....you might dislike or mistrust the idea that we're bound by moral ties we haven't chosen...to be free is to be the author of the only obligations that constrain us."
Chapter 10--Justice and the common good.
page 261:
"Questions of justice are bound up with competing notions of honor and virtue, pride and recognition. Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things."
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